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Abstract
Constitutional amendment difficulty or rigidity has generated extensive literature in recent times, both
conceptually and empirically. Although constitutional scholars seem divided about the importance and
significance of amendment limits, there has been a proliferation of indicators and statistical analysis.
In this Article, while recognizing the normative debate, we provide an empirical exploration for thirty-
seven countries based on factor analysis of both formal procedural rules—usually the focus of empirical
work—and substantial amendment rules—which are less developed in the quantitative literature. We dis-
cuss the existing contradictions across available indicators. Implications for the literature are derived.
Keywords Measuring amendment difficulty; formal and substantial limitations; constitutional rigidity and flexibility;
normative and empirical legal reasoning
A. Introduction
Constitutional amendment rules keep the constitutional text safe from political volatility and the
caprices of occasional majorities by demanding higher requirements than the amendment of ordi-
nary laws. An “optimal degree of flexibility” would be in the delicate balance of having a
constitution not too easy yet not impossible to amend.1 It is important to remember that amend-
ment rules “are both sword and shield,” as they define which constitutional subjects can and can-
not be changed or require severe hurdles to do so.2
Nevertheless, that ideal degree of flexibility varies across countries in response to many local deter-
minants. Constitutions adjust mainly through formal amendment and informal interpretation.3 In
broad terms, constitutional rigidity means that the constitution is more difficult to amend than
ordinary laws.
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In this Article, we pursue an empirical exploration of procedural amendment rules—rules that
regulate the process by which a constitutional amendment is passed—and substantial amendment
rules—rules that limit what can be amended. Due to significant limitations concerning informa-
tion about substantial amendment rules—particularly, potential implicit limits—we restrict the
sample to the member states of the European Union plus some other countries in its periphery
for a total of thirty-seven countries. We innovate at four levels: We expand the previous empirical
discussion to explicitly account for substantial amendment rules in contrast with previous empir-
ical approaches, which have historically focused primarily, if not solely, on procedural amendment
rules; we combine factor analysis—that is, rather than subjective assessments, we let variance
across jurisdictions drive the indicators—with conventional regression analysis; we explicitly
compare previous indicators for “amendment difficulty” in order to assess their relative impor-
tance; we also explore possible explanatory variables within the sample of countries and find some
relevant regularities across indicators.
Our findings suggest that there is no clear substitution effect between procedural and substan-
tial amendment rules. If a procedure to amend is hard, then there is less need for substantive
limits. Conversely, if a procedure to amend is easy, then there may be more substantive limita-
tions. We cannot find empirical support to this reasoning in the context of the thirty-seven coun-
tries we include in our analysis.
Our findings must be interpreted in the context of comparative constitutional scholarship. If a
decade ago, the field was starting to comprehend and measure the “actual determinants of the rate
or difficulty of constitutional amendments,”4 today, such studies are flourishing.5 This new aca-
demic path seems quite promising. Clearly, constitutional design shapes structural choices, such as
the enforcement of fundamental rights, influence on public policy, or the weight of social welfare.6
Initially, the challenge of written constitutions is creating permanence within plural societies,
permeable to dynamic idiosyncrasies and polities.7 Without a doubt, amendment rules are quite
relevant, as they minimize the risk of abusive constitutionalism and enable people to revisit their
constitution.8
Modern constitutionalism usually relies on written and, therefore, rigid constitutions posi-
tioned on the top of the normative hierarchy or at least above ordinary state law. However, there
are some exceptions to this tendency—including the well-known examples of the constitutional
law of the United Kingdom and Israel—which are not codified in a single, unified document
4Id. at 105.
5See Lech Garlicki & Yaniv Roznai, European Perspectives on Constitutional Unamendability, 21 EUR. J.L. REFORM 217 (2019);
PAUL YOWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: MORAL AND EMPIRICAL REASONING IN JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2018); RICHARD ALBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: MAKING, BREAKING AND CHANGING CONSTITUTIONS,
92–72, 324–37 (2019); CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION IN LATIN AMERICA (Richard Albert et al. eds.,
2018); QUASI-CONSTITUTIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES: FORMS, FUNCTIONS, APPLICATIONS (Richard Albert &
Joel I. Cólon-Ríos eds, 2019); FOUNDING MOMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONALISM (Richard Albert et al. eds., 2019); THE
FOUNDATIONS AND TRADITIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Richard Albert et al. eds., 2017); ASSESSING
CONSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE, (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Z. Huq eds., 2016); COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN,
(Tom Ginsburg ed., 2012); COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011); XENOPHON
CONTIADES, ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPA, CANADA AND THE USA
(2013); YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: THE LIMITS OF AMENDMENT POWERS (2017).
6Bjørn E. Rasch & Roger D. Congleton, Amendment Procedures and Constitutional Stability, in DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PUBLIC POLICY: ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE 536, 537 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta
Swedenborg eds., 2006).
7Catarina Santos Botelho, Constitutional Narcissism on the Couch of Psychoanalysis: Constitutional Unamendability
in Portugal and Spain, 21 EUR. J.L. REFORM, 346, 347 (2019); see also M. Hisao Kurik, Die Theorie der
Verfassungsentwicklung, in VERFASSUNGSÄNDERUNG, VERFASSUNGSWANDEL, VERFASSUNGSINTERPRETATION: VORTRÄGE BEI
DEUSTCH-JAPANISCHEN SYMPOSIEN IN TOKYO 2004 UND FREIBURG 2005, 13, 20–21 (Rainer Wahl ed., 2010); Rosalind Dixon
& David Landau, Tiered Constitutional Design, 86 GEO. WAS. L. REV. 438 (2018).
8Xenophon Contiades & Alkemene Fotiadou, Amendment-metrics, in THE FOUNDATIONS AND TRADITIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 219, 227 (Richard Albert et al. eds., 2017).
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labeled as “the constitution.”9 The Constitution of Canada is also an interesting case because
it is partially compiled in an uncodified document and is one of the world’s most difficult
democratic constitutions to change by formal amendment, even harder than the United States
Constitution.10
Not surprisingly, measuring amendment difficulty11 has hurdles of its own. Traditionally, the
amendment rate was closely linked to the amendment procedure itself and to the several institu-
tional factors that constrained constitutional amendments, such as high voting thresholds or
intervention by numerous political actors. In this sense, stringent procedures would lower the
number of constitutional amendments, and generous procedures would raise them. With this
in mind, some scholars12 prefer to measure constitutional rigidity not using amendment rule met-
rics but by focusing on the infrequency of amendments.13 When amendment frequency is too
high, it might suggest the likelihood of a constitutional replacement.14 In this respect, there
has been a proliferation of empirical measurements of and controversies over amendment diffi-
culty in the last decade or so.15
Our findings confirm that different statistical methodologies produce inconsistent classifica-
tions to a degree. Correlations across indicators are not as high as expected, suggesting that differ-
ent scholars may have measured different things under the same label of amendment difficulty. It
could be that ongoing debates partially reflect the use of different datasets under the same des-
ignation of amendment difficulty.
This Article is structured as follows: In Section B, we develop our approach to amendment
difficulty. In Section C, we present our empirical exploration. The results are contextualized in
Section D, where we review current discussions on amendment difficulty across comparative con-
stitutional law and empirical legal studies. Final conclusions and remarks about future research are
presented in Section E.
B. Defining Concepts: From Amendment Difficulty to Substance and Procedure
This section introduces the important concepts about amendment difficulty and substantial and
procedural amendment limits. We also discuss why previous literature failed to focus on this
important distinction.
I. Why Substantial and Procedure Amendment Rules Matter
Most constitutional democracies share the common trait of having rigidly written constitutions,
comprised of a formal entrenchment under a higher-than-ordinary rule of change. Therefore, this
rigidity among constitutional democracies invites an important point: Constitutional rigidity can
occur a priori (formal or substantial limitations or both) or a posteriori (judicial review of con-
stitutional amendments).
9See Michael Hein, The Constitutional Entrenchment Clauses Dataset, UNIV. GÖTTINGEN (2018), http://data.
michaelhein.de.
10Richard Albert, The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada, 53 ALTA. L. REV. 85 (2015).
11Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the
Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, 13 ICON 686 (2015). Contra George Tsebelis, The Time Inconsistency of Long
Constitutions: Evidence from the World, 56 EUR. J. POL. RES. 820 (2017).
12Rasch & Congleton, supra note 6, at 545; Mila Versteeg & Emily Zachin, Constitutions Unentrenched: Toward an
Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 657 (2016); see also Ginsburg & Melton, supra note
11, at 700.
13Versteeg & Zachin, supra note 12, at 661.
14Dixon, supra note 3, at 102.
15See Astrid Lorenz, How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity: Four Concepts and Two Alternatives, 17 J. THEORETICAL
POL. 339, 336–39 (2005); George Tsebelis, Constitutional Rigidity Matters: A Veto Players Approach, BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. (2021).
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Within an a priori model, limits can be formal—procedural, temporal, and circumstantial—
substantial, or both.16 Formal limits impose several requirements to constitutional reform, such as
procedural, temporal, and circumstantial rules that bind the constitutional veto players.17
In fact, procedural limits can demand that the power to initiate a constitutional amendment
belongs to a singular actor or multiple actors, single or multiple procedures for amendment,
approval by multiple houses—a common trait in bicameral and presidential systems—super-
majority threshold in Parliament, multiple rounds of voting, popular participation either direct
(referendum) or indirect (dissolution of Parliament), and intervention or approval by other bodies
such as councils, head of state, executive branch or a convening special constituent assemblies.
Additionally, temporal limitations might establish a timeframe between amendments, and circum-
stantial limitations can impede amendments during a state of siege, a state of emergency, or a state
of war amongst others.
Substantial limits relate to the constitutional core of a given society that is immune to change—
these limitations are called unamendable clauses, gag rules, immutable clauses, entrenchment
clauses, or eternity clauses. If some of the eternity clauses are intrinsic traits of a democratic state
such as the separation of the state and the church, others reveal a specific political choice— fed-
eration or unitary state—or “re-join with the old idea of a natural law above the national and
international legal positivation—human dignity and natural rights.”18
Substantial limitations can be explicit or implicit. Explicit—or express—substantial limitations
are consecrated in the constitution, such as the famous Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law, the
intriguing Article 121 of the Constitution of Norway,19 or, the longest unamendable clause in the
world, Article 288 of the Portuguese Constitution.20
In practice, many states recognize implicit unamendable clauses. Recent years have witnessed
that not only states without eternity clauses such as Slovakia, Colombia, or India, but also states
with eternity clauses, such as Brazil or Italy, have acknowledged some basic principles immune to
constitutional change. To use John Rawls’ famous expression, the “constitutional essentials”might
be the constitutional core of liberal democracies and the basic traits of a given constitution.21
Within an a posteriori model—meaning after amending the constitution—there may be signs
of rigidity if the amendment is subjected to constitutional review. For example, in Turkey and the
Czech Republic, constitutional amendments were invalidated for violating explicit unamendable
clauses.22 Worth noting in the African context is the African Court on Human and People’s
Rights, which has a wider material jurisdiction than other international judicial courts, such as
the European Court of Human Rights, and can challenge regressive constitutional amendments.23
16For a classification of constitutional amendment rules, see Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment
Rules, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 913 (2014).
17Tsebelis, supra note 15, at 14. (defining veto players as “series of collective or individual actors, such as one or both
chambers of a legislature, or a special assembly, or a referendum, or an elected president, that are required to agree on
the revised text in order for a revision to be approved”).
18Botelho, supra note 7, at 356.
19Article 121 states that “[s]uch amendment must never, however, contradict the principles embodied in this Constitution,
but solely relate to modifications of particular provisions which do not alter the spirit of the Constitution.” CONSITUTION OF
NORWAY, ART. 121.
20Botelho, supra note 7, at 363–67.
21JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 227–31 (2005).
22SeeUlrich K. Preuss, The Implications of “Eternity Clauses”: The German Experience, 44 ISR. L. REV. 429, 429 (2011); Yaniv
Roznai & Serkan Yolcu, An Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment — The Turkish Perspective: A Comment on the
Turkish Constitutional Court’s Headscarf Decision, 10 ICON 175, 175 (2012); Yaniv Roznai, Legisprudence Limitations on
Constitutional Amendments? Reflections on the Czech Constitutional Court’s Declaration of Unconstitutional
Constitutional Act, 8 VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. L., 29, 29 (2014).
23Adem K. Abebe, Taming Regressive Constitutional Amendments: The African Court as a Continental (super)
Constitutional Court, 17 ICON 89, 108–10 (2019).
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However, the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment “has not yet matured into a
global norm of constitutionalism.”24
In Europe, it is important to mention the recent decision of the Constitutional Court of
Slovakia, in which the Court declared the unconstitutionality of a constitutional amendment.
This decision is of paramount importance, as it was the first time in Europe that a constitutional
court exercised substantial judicial review of constitutional amendments grounded on implicit
unamendable clauses.25
The degree to which constitutional text is shielded from futile or impulsive changes depends on
its measure of rigidity.26 To some extent, rating constitutional amendments over a predetermined
period of time27 might be deceptive, as we would be comparing old and new constitutions.28 The
same goes for measuring constitutional change by frequency, as the amount of constitutional
change can vary: There can be extensive amendments that significantly change a constitution,
whereas minor amendments might be just slight cosmetic changes.29 Thus, it is relevant not to
treat all formal amendments as mere numbers irrespective of their “purpose, content, or scope.”30
II. Previous Empirical Literature has not Explored the Distinction Between Substantial and
Procedure Amendment Rules
In search of the ideal amendment rate, Donald Lutz presented some important propositions in his
seminal work:
The longer a constitution is (the more words it has), the higher its amendment rate, and the
shorter a constitution, the lower its amendment rate. . . . The more difficult the amendment
process, the lower the amendment rate, and the easier the amendment process, the higher the
amendment rate. . . . The more governmental functions dealt with in a constitution, the
longer it will be and the higher its rate of amendment will be. . . . A low amendment rate,
associated with a long average constitutional duration, strongly implies the use of some alter-
nate means of revision to supplement the formal amendment process.31
However, Rasch and Congleton argue that Lutz’s, and also Ferejohn’s, empirical relationship
between stringency and amendment rates lacks consistency.32 With this in mind, these authors
state that the amendment rate is “an imperfect measure of constitutional stability” and that it
“neglects other elements of change.” Additionally, amendment counts “assign equal importance”
to both major and minor amendments.
Developing this idea, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton astutely outline the “amendment cul-
ture” as a far more important predictor of constitutional change than the constitutional
24Richard Albert, Malkhaz Nakashidze & Tarik Olcay, The Formalist Resistance to Unconstitutional Constitutional
Amendments, 70 HASTINGS L.J., 639, 642 (2019). The authors emphasize that the increasing prevalence of the unconstitutional
constitutional amendment doctrine should not be perceived “as evidence of its appropriateness for all constitutional states.”
25PL. ÚS 21/2014.96. See Lech Garlicki & Yaniv Roznai, Introduction: Constitutional Unamendability in Europe, 21 EUR. J L.
REFORM, 217, 217–18 (2019); see also Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism as a Limited Doctrine
of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 13 ICON 606, 606 (2015) (arguing that unconstitutional constitutional
amendments grounded on implicit limits violations should depend on some “cross-country” consensus or, in other words,
of a comparative constitutional approach).
26Botelho, supra note 7, at 353.
27Lorenz, supra note 15, at 348.
28Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 11, at 695.
29Id. at 702–03.
30Contiades & Fotiadou, supra note 8, at 225.
31Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 335, 365 (1994).
32Rasch & Congleton, supra note 6, at 545. For a sharp critique, see RICHARD ALBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS:
MAKING, BREAKING AND CHANGING CONSTITUTIONS, 100–07 (2019).
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amendment design.33 Consequently, amendment difficulty did not relate to the traditional metrics
of institutional indices or variables, but instead to extra-institutional forces such as constitutional
behavior.34 Ginsburg and Melton define “amendment culture” as “the set of shared attitudes about
the desirability of amendment, independent of the substantive issue under consideration and the
degree of pressure for change.”35 In other words, stringent amendment procedures depend not
only on institutional forces but also on more vague assertions, such as the “perceptions about
the place of constitution in society.”
In either event, “both procedure and culture affect flexibility.” According to Contiades and
Fotiadou, “the constitutional and political culture are sources of factual rigidity that blocks con-
stitutional change even when it is procedurally available.”36 In fact, there can be factual rigidities
that block the constitutional amendment process even in the absence of explicit procedural or
substantial limits.37 Rather than respecting the constituent democratic will of the people, the
apparent legislative omnipotence is restricted by other obstacles, such as judicial activism, the legal
culture, or political liability.
Contrary to Ginsburg and Melton’s assertion, Tsebelis returns to Burgess’s statement that con-
stitutional amendment rules do have a significant impact on amendment frequency, and argues
that the relationship between constitutional rigidity and significant amendment frequency is “het-
eroskedastic.”38 Besides this, Tsebelis introduced two innovations to the traditional approach:
First, an index of constitutional rigidity on the basis of veto players, not just a subset of institu-
tional rules;39 second, one should consider amendment rules only in democratic states where insti-
tutional rules are expected to apply.
Additionally, instead of measuring the frequency of all constitutional amendments, Tsebelis
explores their “significance”40 and concludes that “constitutional rigidity leads to fewer significant
amendments, and constitutional flexibility may or may not lead to the adoption of significant
amendments.”41
The outcomes of Tsebelis’s research proved that “constitutional rigidity affects the frequency of
significant amendments in the following way: High rigidity makes amendments rare, but low
rigidity simply enables amendments, which may or may not occur, depending on political, social,
or economic factors. As a result, low constitutional rigidity produces a higher average rate and a
higher variance of significant constitutional amendments. The higher the significance of amend-
ments, the stronger the above relationship.”42
In sum, there are two different schools of thought concerning the measurement of amendment
rigidity, but neither has explicitly explored the distinction between substantial and procedural
dimensions. The distinct role of procedural amendment rules—rules that regulate the process
by which a constitutional amendment is passed—and substantial amendment rules—rules that
limit what can be amended although widely recognized by the normative literature, has not been
studied through the lens of empirical analysis. This Article aims to fill that gap.
33Id. at 548; Albert, supra note 2, at 13. For a broader discussion regarding “constitutional culture,” see Gary Jacobsohn,
CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY (2010), and Jason Mazzone, The Creation of a Constitutional Culture, 40 TULSA L. REV. 671
(2004).
34Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 11, at 687.
35Id.at 699.
36Xenophon Contiades & Alkemene Fotiadou, Constitutional Resilience and Unamendability: Amendment Powers as
Mechanisms of Constitutional Resilience, 21 EUR. J.L. REFORM, 243, 246 (2019).
37Id. at 253.
38Tsebelis, supra note 15.
39See Rasch & Congleton, supra note 6, at 543 (arguing that is becomes more difficult to amend a constitution “as the
number of actors and decision points increase, and as the required degree of consensus increases”).
40Tsebelis, supra note 15.
41Id. The questionnaire presented a three-class typology of amendment significance, consisting of “amendments of excep-
tional significance,” “significant amendments,” and “insignificant amendments.”
42Tsebelis, supra note 15.
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C. Exploring the Data
This section explores the empirical question. We start by describing the dataset using factor analy-
sis. This exercise allows us to suggest two distinct indicators to measure substantial and procedural
amendment limits. The following step is to apply the same methodology to a different dataset on
constitutional amendments. The third stage is to compare all indicators and debate possible pat-
terns of correlation. A final robustness check is to detect and interpret possible regularities across
these different indicators by means of regression analysis.
I. Dataset
The authors have collected information about substantial and procedural amendment limits or
rules as they were de jure in 2018 for all member states of the European Union plus a sample
of countries in the European Union’s periphery. The nine additional countries are not a random
sample, but those for which information about substantial amendment rules are available; infor-
mation about procedural amendment rules per country is easier to find in the conventional liter-
ature. The thirty-seven countries included in the study are shown in Table 1, with particular
reference to the twenty-eight members of the European Union—as it was in 2019. For each of
the thirty-seven countries, the collected information about substantial and procedural amendment
rules and other available indicators is detailed in Tables 2A and 2B.43
Procedure includes eight dummy variables concerning amendment rules satisfying the follow-
ing procedural requirements: (i) explicit constitutional regulation, (ii) approval by multiple houses
of parliament, (iii) approval by supermajority, (iv) approval by referendum; (v) timeframe for
approval is regulated by the constitution, (vi) approval requires dissolution of parliament and
new general elections, (vii) approval by additional political bodies (excluding constitutional
court), and (viii) approval by the constitutional court and subject to constitutional review.
Substance also includes eight dummy variables, but in this case concerning amendment rules
satisfying the following substantive requirements: (i) comply with material limits to amendments,
(ii) these material limits are explicit in a codified constitution, (iii) these explicit limits concern the
form of government, (iv) these explicit limits concern the form of government as well as other
political issues, (v) these explicit limits concern individual rights, (vi) these material limits are
also implicit, (vii) these implicit limits concern general principles of law—such as the rule of
law—and (viii) these implicit limits concern general principles of law as well as other legal issues.
Based on the collected information for each of the thirty-seven jurisdictions, we used factor
analysis to construct two indicators—procedure and substance. Factor analysis provides for a
Table 1. List of Countries
Albania Estonia (EU) Israel Poland (EU) Sweden (EU)
Austria (EU) Finland (EU) Italy (EU) Portugal (EU) Switzerland
Belgium (EU) France (EU) Latvia (EU) Romania (EU) Turkey
Bulgaria (EU) Germany (EU) Lithuania (EU) Russia UK (EU)
Croatia (EU) Greece (EU) Luxembourg (EU) Serbia Ukraine
Cyprus (EU) Hungary (EU) Malta (EU) Slovak Rep (EU)
Czech Rep (EU) Iceland Netherlands (EU) Slovenia (EU)
Denmark (EU) Ireland (EU) Norway Spain (EU)
43The information reflects their constitutional texts, statutes, and conventional principles—in the case of jurisdictions with-
out codified constitutions such as the UK—and recent case law—for purposes of implicit substantive limits. The dataset is
available from the authors upon request.
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statistical indicator that summarizes information about a set of variables by exploring differences
in variance.44 Both procedure and substance reflect in statistical ways the variance across the
underlying eight dummy variables.45 Therefore, the reported indicators are driven by data con-
siderations rather than subjective conjectures about each variable’s nature or additivity. For exam-
ple, the weight each of the eight dummies has on a given indicator—procedure or substance—is
determined by factor analysis and not some ad hoc consideration.
Considering procedure, we include the dummy variables from regulated to review in Table 2A.
Denmark emerges with the lowest value, easy procedure for amendment, followed closely by
Iceland and Croatia. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, and Germany emerge with the highest value,
most complex and distinct procedure for amendment, followed closely by Romania. Statistically,
this indicator reflects all included variables except dissolution, which does not seem significant for
statistical purposes due to low variance because very few jurisdictions have such formal
requirements.46
The same methodology follows for substance, with the dummy variables from limits to more
than general on Table 2A. A group of countries exhibits the lowest value: Albania, Bulgaria,
Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland,
Slovak Republic, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. All of them have very few substantive
restrictions according to our data collection. With the highest value, we find Cyprus,
Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Romania, and Turkey. Notably, this indicator is more polar-
ized—in the sense that more countries are at each extreme—than procedure because only a subset
of variables matters statistically. In fact, substance is mainly determined by the explicit rather than
implicit substantive limits. Again, this is a statistical artifact derived from the low variance of
Table 2A. Variables Included in Procedure and Substance
Variable Description Variable Description
procedure substance
regulated Amendments are explicitly regulated limits There are substantial/material limits to amend-
ments
double Amendments require approval by
multiple houses/chambers of
parliament
explicit These substantial limits are explicit
supermajority Amendments require supermajority form These explicit substantial limits concern the
form of government
referendum Amendments require referendum more
than
form
These explicit substantial limits concern the
form of government and more
timeframe Timeframe between amendments is
regulated
rights These explicit substantial limits include individ-
ual rights
dissolution Amendments require dissolution implicit These substantial limits are implicit
further Amendments require additional politi-
cal bodies
general These implicit substantial limits concern gen-
eral principles of law such as rule of law





These implicit substantial limits concern gen-
eral principles of law such as rule of law and
more
44The information about the statistical determination of all indicators is available from the authors upon request.
45The numerical indicators are reported for each country in appendix, Table A1.
46The factor analysis for procedure is available from the authors upon request.
German Law Journal 223
implicit, general, and more than general. In our sample of countries, very few jurisdictions are
coded as having implicit substantive limits.48
So now, by using factor analysis, we have reduced sixteen variables to two statistical indicators:
Procedure and substance. In this next stage, we created a third indicator, amendment, which results
from the previous two. Cyprus and Germany come out as the countries with the highest value—
more procedural and substantive limits when combined. The opposite position goes to
Denmark.49
Table 3A shows the distribution of countries per indicator. A few countries are considered low
across both indicators: Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Slovenia, and Sweden. Another group
is reported as high across both indicators: Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Portugal, and Romania. The
other twenty-six countries have different positions in between. We can also find the UK as low
procedure and high substance, mainly due to the common law principle. At the opposite end, we
have Austria, Hungary, Lithuania, and Spain as high procedure and low substance.
Table 2B. Other Indicators and Variables
Variable Description Data Limitation
CRI1 Constitutional Rigidity Index (Tsebelis) Malta and Russia are excluded
CRI2 Constitutional Rigidity Index (Lorenz) Fifteen countries are excluded
CRI3 Constitutional Rigidity Index (Anckar and
Karvonen)
Fifteen countries are excluded
SUMGM Summing Amendment Variables in Ginsburg and
Melton
Israel and UK are coded as zeros for all variables in
the original dataset
CRIGM Factor Analysis with Amendment Variables in
Ginsburg and Melton
Israel and UK are coded as zeros for all variables in
the original dataset
year Year of approval of constitution
amendrate Number of constitutional amendments as of
2018
EU EU membership as 2018
common Common Law legal family
scandy Scandinavian country
former Former Socialist country
cr No formal constitutional review
uncodified No formal codified constitution
federal Federal country
gdppc GDPpc (IMF, 2017)
ruleoflaw Rule of law indicator, World Bank (2016)
lang Linguistic diversity (Alesina et al)47
rel Religious diversity (Alesina et al)
47Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat & Romain Wacziarg, Fractionalization, 8 J.
ECON. GROWTH 155 (2003).
48The factor analysis for substance is available from the authors upon request.
49We think this approach is more consistent with our analysis of substance and procedure. An alternative view would be to
apply factor analysis to all sixteen dummy variables at the same time. The results from this alternative approach are largely
consistent with ours. All results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 3B shows the distribution of countries in the composite indicator amendment. Countries
considered low or high across both indicators are easily assigned in this table. The more interest-
ing countries are those in the minor diagonal of Table 3A, with one high and one low indicator.
One example is the UK, low procedure, high substance, which is assigned to low amendment as
expected. A different example is Spain, high procedure, low substance, which is allocated to the
opposite group, high amendment, also as expected.
In terms of correlation, following table 4A, we can see that amendment is highly correlated with
the partial indicators (85%). However, the partial indicators are only correlated between them-
selves at a lower degree (45%). By factor analysis, amendment reflects equally procedure and sub-
stance. However, procedure and substance are only mildly positively correlated.
II. Ginsburg and Melton (2015) Dataset
In their seminal article, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton50 explore a rich group of variables about
constitutional amendments by making use of the Comparative Constitutions Project51 data. These
variables provide extensive information about constitutional amendments in mainly three areas—
the number of proposers, the number of approvers, and the political body making the last step in
the constitutional amendment process. Following the previously explained methodology, we
applied factor analysis to each group of variables. Factor analysis was applied a second time to
encompass the three dimensions. The resulting indicator—CRIGM—measures “amendment dif-
ficulty” according to the data used by Ginsburg and Melton.52 It increases with both the number of
approvers and final approver dimensions—an amendment is more difficult if it requires a signifi-
cant number of actors. It decreases with number of proposers’ dimension—an amendment is eas-
ier if more actors can start the process. Under this new indicator, Italy and Romania come out as
the least rigid while Bulgaria is the most rigid jurisdiction.
Table 3A. Distribution of Countries per Procedure and Substance





Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Israel,






Luxembourg France Czech Rep, Italy
High
Substance





Table 3B. Distribution of Countries per Amendment
Low
Amendment
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Slovak Rep, Slovenia, Sweden, UK
High
Amendment
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Rep, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine
50Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 11.
51COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT HOME PAGE, http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ (last visited on March
20, 2020).
52The factor analysis is available from the authors upon request. The results per country are presented in appendix,
Table A1.
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Table 4A compares CRIGM and a second indicator using Ginsburg and Melton’s data—a sim-
ple sum of all variables in their dataset SUMGM—thus each variable has the same unitary weight
as our own factor analysis indicators. Remarkably, CRIGM and procedure seem orthogonal. In
fact, CRIGM has a zero correlation with procedure, a negative 21% correlation with substance,
and a negative 11% with amendment. Therefore, reflecting the data’s actual dimensions, we might
argue that CRIGM and our indicators measure very different constitutional limitations.
Furthermore, our indicators have a significant negative correlation with SUMGM.
Table 3C reports the distribution of countries per amendment and CRIGM. The orthogonality
is clear. The main diagonal is where we would expect countries to be, yet only eleven countries are
there, including Israel and UK. The minor diagonal should be intrinsically exceptional because
these are jurisdictions for which amendment and CRIGM provide contradicting numbers.
Twenty-six countries are located in the minor diagonal.
III. Correlation Across Constitutional Rigidity Indicators
We turn now to comparisons with other available indicators, namely constitutional rigidity mea-
sured by Tsebelis (CRI1 in Table 2B)53, Lorenz (CR2 in Table 2B)54 and Anckar and Karvonen
(CRI3 in Table 2B)55 as documented by Lorenz. Confirming previous analyses, we find limited
correlation across all these indicators.
Tables 4B and 4C show the results for thirty-five and twenty-two countries respectively. The
reason for not using thirty-seven countries is that previous studies do not use the exact same sam-
ple of countries as we do. Amendment does not seem strongly correlated with any other indicator.
However, CRIGM has a reasonable degree of correlation with CRI3, suggesting that both measure
procedural rigidity on the same lines. In fact, CRI3 has a 45% correlation with procedure itself.
Table 3C. Distribution of Countries per Amendment and Ginsburg and Melton (2015)
Low Amendment High Amendment
Low GM (2015) Hungary, Israel, Netherlands, Poland,
Slovak Rep, UK
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Rep,
France, Germany, Italy, Romania, Russia,
Spain, Switzerland
High GM (2015) Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Serbia,
Slovenia, Sweden,
Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal,
Ukraine
Table 4A. Correlations with 37 countries
procedure Substance amendment SUMGM CRIGM
procedure 1.00
substance 0.45 1.00
amendment 0.85 0.85 1.00
SUMGM −0.43 −0.25 −0.40 1.00
CRIGM 0.02 −0.21 −0.11 0.18 1.00
53Tsebelis, supra note 15.
54Lorenz, supra note 15.
55Dag Anckar & Lauri Karvonen, Constitutional Amendment Methods in the Democracies of the World, Presentation at
the XIIIth Nordic Political Science Congress (Aug. 15–17, 2002).
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CRI1 and CRI2 also come out as somehow related—about 40% correlation—while CRI2 is neg-
atively correlated to CRIGM—about 35%.
In sum, the indicators on amendment rigidity are not entirely consistent. CRI1 and CRI2 seem
familiar to each other but unrelated to procedure or substance. CRIGM seems positively related to
all previous indicator, namely CRI1, CRI2 and CRI3. However, procedure and CRI3 emerge as
significantly related. Finally, our own amendment seems to stand on its own—that is, with no
strong correlation to any other previous indicator. Therefore, it is an empirical shortcoming that
a collection of so many indicators on amendment rigidity reflects disturbing variations.
IV. Regression Analysis
In order to help or provide some guidance over which indicators of amendment rigidity seem
more robust, we can investigate possible determinants. Such exercise is useful to assess the quality
of the indicators by discussing how they respond to simple institutional variety. This is not empiri-
cal research about explaining amendment rigidity across countries as other authors have usefully
done, but merely shedding some light on how different indicators reflect diversity over legal tra-
dition or socioeconomic variables.
We start by studying the determinants of the partial indicators, procedure and substance. We
apply a standard three-stage least squares (3SLS) method of regression due to the possibility that
procedure determines substance and vice-versa, hence a simultaneous equation model. A simple
least squares (OLS) method of regression would be wrong due to likely endogeneity, hence pro-
ducing potentially spurious statistical results. As to amendment, combining both factors in this
case, a simple OLS suffices.
Table 4B. Correlations with 35 Countries (Excludes Malta and Russia)
procedure substance amendment SUMGM CRIGM CRI1
procedure 1.00
substance 0.47 1.00
amendment 0.86 0.85 1.00
SUMGM −0.44 −0.24 −0.40 1.00
CRIGM 0.01 −0.22 −0.12 0.17 1.00
CRI1 0.01 0.20 0.12 −0.09 0.26 1.00
Table 4C. Correlations with twenty-two countries (Excludes Albania, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Latvia,
Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Rep, Turkey, Ukraine)
procedure substance amendment SUMGM CRIGM CRI1 CRI2 CRI3
procedure 1.00
substance 0.36 1.00
amendment 0.83 0.81 1.00
SUMGM −0.43 −0.22 −0.40 1.00
CRIGM −0.05 −0.54 −0.35 0.13 1.00
CRI1 −0.28 −0.11 −0.24 −0.01 0.27 1.00
CRI2 0.02 0.00 0.01 −0.35 0.22 0.40 1.00
CRI3 0.45 −0.20 0.17 −0.18 0.39 0.09 0.25 1.00
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The independent variables of the regression analysis are summarized in Table 2B: Year of the
current constitution; the number of constitutional amendments as of 2018; GDP per capita as of
2017 (International Monetary Fund); the rule of law indicator as of 2016 (World Bank); linguistic
and religious diversity; and a group of dummy variables reflecting EUmembership as of 2018 such
as common law, Scandinavian and former socialist legal families—as in the standard legal origins
literature—no formal constitutional review, no formal codified constitution, and federal country.
The results are reported in Table 5A.56 Due to the limited sample, all regressions exhibit a
decent degree of statistical power.57 Concerning procedure, there are four negative statistically sig-
nificant coefficients: Scandinavian countries; former socialist countries; countries with uncodified
constitutions—Israel and the UK, only at 10% significance; and GDP per capita—only at 5% sig-
nificance. No other variable seems statistically significant.
As to substance, there are two negative statistically significant coefficients: Year of the current
constitution; former socialist countries; and countries without formal constitutional review—only
at 10% significance level. Everything else seems statistically insignificant.
Finally, for amendment— which combines both partial indicators by factor analysis—we find
that “amendment difficulty” has two negative statistically significant coefficients: Scandinavian
countries—only at 5% significance—and former socialist countries. No other variable seems sta-
tistically significant.
Therefore, the only variable that seems statistically significant across the three regressions is
former socialist countries with a negative coefficient in all specifications. Also, notice that any
Table 5A. Regression Analysis
procedure (3SLS) substance (3SLS) amendment (OLS)
Observations 37 37 37
R-square 0.67 0.71 0.45
constant −0.01 13.46*** 7.91*
year 0.00 −0.01*** −0.00
amendrate 0.01 −0.01 −0.00
EU −0.40 −0.39 −0.46
common −0.35 −0.57 −0.53
scandy −1.84*** −0.85 −1.58**
former −0.95*** −1.35*** −1.35***
cr −1.25 −1.41* −1.57
uncodified −1.60* −1.26 −1.64
federal −0.36 0.38 0.01
gdppc −0.00002** −0.00 −0.00
Rule of law 0.01 −0.01 −0.00
lang 0.00 0.00 0.00
rel 0.01 0.01 0.01
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10%
56The STATA outputs are available from the authors upon request.
57The statistical results concerning the coefficients do not indicate any particular concern with autocorrelation.
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possible concern about using amendrate on the right-hand-side of the estimated equations are
reduced when we find that it has very little statistical power.58
We also explore the determinants of two alternative indicators: CRIGM and CRI1. Concerning
the indicator using Ginsburg and Melton’s data, we find that former socialist countries have a
positive impact on the indicator—at 10% significance level. With CRI1, we lose two observa-
tions—Malta and Russia. The main result is that the number of constitutional amendments in
the past is negatively related to rigidity in 2018, not a surprising result given the way Tsebelis
has built the indicator he reports. It also shows that common law jurisdictions, at a significance
level of 10%, seem to have a negative impact on the indicator, a result we would not emphasize
given the lower number of common law jurisdictions in our European sample.
Overall, by comparing the three regressions stated in Table 5B, we can see that our amendment
indicator seems more robust to institutional variety, while the other two indicators, CRIGM and
CRI1, seem somehow more random. Additional indicators, CRI2 and CRI3, were not inspected by
regression analysis due to the limited number of observations, only twenty-two.
In conclusion, our amendment indicator seems to capture institutional variety in more con-
sistent ways within the sample of thirty-seven countries we have than the other two alternative
indicators. This, by itself, does not imply in any way that our indicators are superior to the other
existing indicators. In our view, it simply reflects that using factor analysis seems to be a more
consistent method to absorb institutional differences in relation to procedure, substance, and
amendment.
Table 5B. Regression Analysis
amendment (OLS) CRIGM (OLS) CRI1 (OLS)
Observations 37 37 35
R-square 0.45 0.55 0.53
constant 7.91* −0.02 0.69
year −0.00 0.00 0.00
amendrate −0.00 0.01 −0.01**
EU −0.46 −0.42 0.17
common −0.53 0.78 0.30*
scandy −1.58** 0.87 0.24
former −1.35*** 1.01* −0.15
cr −1.57 0.33 0.04
uncodified −1.64 −0.99 0.33
federal 0.01 −0.68 0.20
gdppc −0.00 0.00 −0.00
Rule of law −0.00 −0.01 −0.00
lang 0.00 0.00 −0.00
rel 0.01 −0.01 −0.00
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10%
58Amendment rates reflecting past experience could influence current “amendment rigidity,” but, at the same time, it is
likely that current “amendment rigidity” follows past “amendment rigidity,” which in turn shapes amendment rates.
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D. Limits of Comparative Constitutional Theory
This section contextualizes our findings in the previous section in a critical way. The existing con-
tradictions across available indicators reflect variations on methodology and confusing concep-
tualization in relation to procedural and substantial amendment rules. It is important to
explore current understandings of constitutional rigidity. At the same time, contradicting empiri-
cal evidence seems to support skepticism by the more traditional literature towards recent trends
in scholarship. On the contrary, we suggest that contradicting empirical evidence requires a more
nuanced view of results and legal implications.
A liberal democracy’s “minimum core,”59 “constitutional DNA,”60 or “the alma mater of
modern constitutionalism”61 could offer protection against populist constitutional transforma-
tions that have recently taken hold in certain modern constitutional liberal democracies.62
Unsurprisingly, supporters of illiberal democracy argue for unlimited constitutional amendment
powers, which means “an absolute primacy of politics over the rule of law.”63 The weakness, how-
ever, concerns the inability of unamendable theories to prevent “democratic backsliding.”64
For one thing, unamendable clauses are not a common constitutional trait. In fact, “out of the
742 constitutions that were examined, 212 constitutions (28%) include or included unamendable
provisions.”65 Substantively constraining the power of constitutional amendment is the same as
prohibiting total constitutional amendments, hence tightening the range of democratic deliber-
ation. Therefore, the constitutional amendment process will always be a partial one, as some
aspects of a given constitutional identity are shielded by the constitutional text.
I. Current Arguments Against and for Measuring the Quantum of Change in Dissimilar
Constitutional Experiences
When compared with the interpretation of ordinary norms, constitutional interpretation poses
different challenges.66 On the one hand, constitutional design is often abstract, flexible, and drawn
with high substantial density. To maintain its democratic legitimacy, a constitution should accom-
modate many worldviews.67 Thus, it is abstraction that allows the existence of several societal and
political choices under the same constitutional roof.68 On the other hand, constitutional text tends
to be more laconic than ordinary laws, although one should stress that some aspirational consti-
tutions, such as the Portuguese or the Brazilian, are quite prolix.69
59Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Democracy and the Constitutional Minimum Core, in ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL
PERFORMANCE 268 (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Z. Huq eds., 2016).
60Botelho, supra note 7, at 373 (“[T]he constitutional DNA from modern liberal constitutionalism shares a few ‘constitu-
tional essentials,’ such as the democratic principle, popular sovereignty, universal suffrage, political and personal rights and
freedoms, and (in several constitutional traditions) social rights intrinsically connected to human dignity (minimum core of
health, basic education, housing, and social security).”).
61Id.
62Gábor Halmai, From a Pariah to a Model? Hungary’s Rise to an Illiberal Member State of the EU, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 35–45 (Wolfgang Benedek et al. eds., 2017).
63Id. at 35-45; Gabor Halmai, Populism, Authoritarianism and Constitutionalism, 20 GERMAN L.J. 296, 306 (2019); Julian
Scholtes, The Complacency of Legality: Constitutionalist Vulnerabilities to Populist Constituent Power, 20 GERMAN L.J. 351, 354
(2019); Luigi Corrias, Populism in a Constitutional Key: Constituent Power, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Identity, 12
EUR. CONST. L. REV. 6, 16. (2016).
64Oran Doyle, Erik Longo & Andrea Pin, Populism: A Health Check for Constitutional Democracy?, 20 GERMAN L.J. 401, 406
(2019).
65ROZNAI, supra note 5, at 21.
66Botelho, supra note 7, at 351–52.
67CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS 19–20 (2009).
68Versteeg & Zachin, supra note 15; Víctor Ferreres Comella, Una Defensa de la Rigidez Constitucional, 23 DOXA.
CUADERNOS DE FILOSOFÍA DEL DERECHO 29, 34–35 (2000).
69Catarina Santos Botelho, Aspirational Constitutionalism, Social Rights Prolixity and Judicial Activism: Trilogy or Trinity?,
3 COMP. CONST. L. & ADMIN. L.Q. 62 (2017).
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For these reasons, in democracies with written constitutions, the constitution is rigid and more
difficult to amend than ordinary norms.70 As noted above, formal constitutional amendment usu-
ally requires a stricter procedure, super-majorities or double-majorities, and involves more actors
than the amendment of ordinary rules. The use of qualified majorities protects minorities as it
“creates constitutional inertia.”71 As Ginsburg and Melton point out, “entrenchment is at the heart
of constitutional stability.”72
Nevertheless, adjusting the “living constitution” within the realm of a constitutional text is dif-
ficult. What are the relevant societal, political, and cultural factors worthy of constitutional con-
secration and constitutional change? One can easily think of a few.
In many European states, before the failed referenda for the approval of the European
Constitution, there was a need to adapt some constitution to allow the potential loss of national
constitutional sovereignty. Likewise, many states had to adapt their constitutions to increasing
international integration. That was the case, for example, of the International Criminal Court,
which has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggres-
sion committed by a state party national, in the territory of a state party, or in a state that has
accepted the jurisdiction of the court.
Moreover, there are a host of problems that come with evolving constitutional interpretation.
In states encouraging dialogic communication between constitutional or supreme courts and
legislatures, formal constitutional amendments can also play a significant role in constitutional-
izing some changes through judicial interpretation.72 Epistemically, constitutional or supreme
court judges and legislators are “fellow interlocutors of the requisite demands of a constitutional
democracy.”74
Constitutional interpretation is not exclusive to the judiciary; if it were, it would form a her-
meneutical circle. If constitutional courts, in some states, have the final word regarding the con-
stitutionality of legislation, the legislator is the first constitutional interpreter.75 With this in mind,
Rosalind Dixon stresses that constitutional amendment can allow legislative and popular actors to
either influence or be influenced by constitutional courts’ interpretation of the constitutional
design.76
Last but not least, formal amendments might also constitutionalize previously accomplished
informal constitutional changes. These are the “quasi-constitutional amendments” where consti-
tutional actors circumvent the “onerous rules of formal amendment” and “resort instead to sub-
constitutional means—for instance, legislation or political practice—whose success requires less
or perhaps even no cross-party and inter-institutional coordination.”77 Alternatively and more
70Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and Contrasts, in EUROPEAN
AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 197, 217–18 (Georg Nolte ed., 2005). ROBERT CHR. VAN OOYEN, POLITIK UND VERFASSUNG:
BEITRÄGE ZU EINER POLITIKWISSENSCHAFTLICHEN VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 24 (2006); Ulrich Ramsauer, Die Rolle der Grundrechte
im System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte, 111 ARCHIV DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 501, 513 (1986).
71Rasch & Congleton, supra note 6, at 544.
72Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 11, at 688.
73Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Agreements Without Constitutional Theories, 13 RATIO JURIS 117 (2000); Catherine A.
Fraser, Constitutional Dialogues Between Courts and Legislatures: Can We Talk?, 14 CONST. F. CONSTITUTIONNEL 7 (2005);
Janet Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHRHelp Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, 4 ICON 1 (2006); Kent
Roach, Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures, 80 CAN. BAR REV.
481 (2001); Kent Roach, Sharpening the Dialogue Debate: The Next Decade of Scholarship, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 169 (2007);
Luc B. Tremblay, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures, 3 ICON 617
(2005). Mark Tushnet, Dialogic Judicial Review, 61 ARK. L. REV. 205 (2008); Roberto Gargarella, ‘We the People’ Outside
the Constitution: The Dialogic Model of Constitutionalism and the System of Checks and Balances, 67 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 1 (2014); and William H. Rehnquist, Notion of a Living Constitution, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 401 (2006).
74PO JEN YAP, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE IN COMMON LAW ASIA 22–23 (2015).
75Botelho, supra note 68, at 76–78.
76Dixon, supra note 3, at 98.
77Richard Albert, Quasi-Constitutional Amendments, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 739, 741–42 (2017).
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broadly, others refer to “controlled” or “uncontrolled silent constitutional change caused by facts
that are not accompanied by a demonstrable intention or awareness of the change on the part of
constitutional actors.”78
The possibility of amending a constitutional text is of paramount importance. First, amending
a constitution somehow resembles the foundational moment and allows the current generation to
completely or partially untie itself from the “constitutional handcuffs” entrenched by the constitu-
tional founders.79 Second, amending the constitution allows the constitutional text to remain
normative and adapt to evolving constitutional culture.
More importantly, the amount of constitutional rigidity is clearly a constitutional design
option. Rigidity can be perceived as the guardian of constitutional stability or its enemy, as dis-
tancing the constitution from the people can provoke revolutionary attitudes. For a constitution,
the norma normarum of the internal legal order, an amendment is consequently a higher chal-
lenge than ordinary norms amendments.
In fact, “if the Constitution is swept away by the unpredictability, manipulation, and the cap-
rices of the given times, it will not be able to influence and to serve as a barometer of the legal,
political, and societal tissue.”80 Constitutional amendment rules thus appear as absorbers of exter-
nal shocks that, if not neutralized, can irritate the constitutional tissue and transform constitu-
tional stability into constitutional “amendmentitis.”81
The power to amend a constitution lies in a “gray area” between the constituent and the con-
stituted power.82 When constitutional actors amend the constitution, they act through a consti-
tuted power—as the rules of the amendment process are entrenched and defined in the
constitution—but there is a kind of constituent power renaissance. The constituent part of
amending a constitution can be, for example, the insertion of a new right in the fundamental rights
catalog or the consecration of increased constitutional justice guarantees.
The degree of constitutional entrenchment depends on the constitutional amendment’s diffi-
culty or, to use Yaniv Roznai’s words, on the idea of a “constitutional escalator.”83 On the one
hand, demanding amendment procedures reflects a romanticized recollection of the constituent
power as a complete, inclusive, and democratic process of constitutional design. Thus, the idea is
to entrench the amendment formula as much as possible so that the constitutional amendment
would be a renaissance of the constituent moment.
On the other hand, more relaxed amendment procedures somehow distance amendment
power from the foundational constitutional moment.84 Additionally, new constitutional rigidity
trends are arising, such as detailed norms that impose strict limitations to constitutional actors—
for example, courts, legislators, and the executive.85
Some states’ constitutional design, such as Spain, adhere to a “selective rigidity,” where some
constitutional provisions demand a more robust process for alteration, whereas other non-fun-
damental constitutional provisions can benefit from easier amendment processes.86
78Reijer Passchier, Quasi-Constitutional Change Without Intent—A Response to Richard Albert, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 1077,
1084–85 (2017); see also LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (2014).
79Richard Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663 (2010); see also Abebe, supra note 23, at 102.
80Botelho, supra note 7, at 353.
81Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, 23 AM. PROSPECT 20 (1995).
82Yaniv Roznai, Amendment Power, Constituent Power, and Popular Sovereignty: Linking Unamendability and Amendment
Procedures, in THE FOUNDATIONS AND TRADITIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 23, 38 (Richard Albert et al. eds.,
2017).
83Roznai, supra note 5, at 164–68.
84David S. Law, Imposed Constitutions and Romantic Constitutions, in THE LAW AND LEGITIMACY OF IMPOSED
CONSTITUTIONS 34 (Richard Albert et al. eds., 2018); Contiades & Fotiadou, supra note 36, at 249; Roznai, supra note 81,
at 23–49.
85Versteeg & Zachin, supra note 12, at 660.
86David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV., 189 (2013); Richard Albert, The Expressive Function of
Constitutional Amendment Rules, 59 MCGILL L.J. 225 (2013); Roznai, supra note 82, at 40.
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II. Empirical Approach to the Study of Constitutional Amendments in the Comparative
Constitutional Literature: Villain or Ally?
As we have previously addressed, though constitutional amendment was not initially a favorite
subject of legal scholarship, by now, comparative law amendment is a solid and distinct field
of study in public law.87 Similarly, empirical constitutionalism, which developed in the 1970s,
is increasingly focused on constitutional amendment rates and their interpretation.88 Yet empiri-
cal legal studies are often perceived as less intellectually sophisticated, with the criticism that the
scholarship merely addresses quantitative approaches. These preconceived notions tend to
obscure rather than illuminate the debate on comparative constitutional law.
The supposed inferiority of empirical legal studies is more evident in civil-law countries with
highly dogmatic legal traditions.89 Specifically, empirical causal inferences can distress traditional
normative mindsets. However, the relevant question remains: Is the empirical approach enriching
to constitutional scholarship or, on the contrary, is it a “distinct way of understanding constitu-
tional law[?]”90
There might be a powerful response to that question. We have reason to believe that in medio
stat virtus, or, in other words, the right answer lies in between. The normative and empirical per-
spectives have different methodological and epistemological approaches.91 To a larger extent, the
normative legal approach focuses on the perfection of a legal system through the theoretical dis-
cussion about what the law—or, in this case, the amendment rules—“ought” to be. In contrast, the
empirical legal approach explores what amendment rules “are” in a given polity, their concrete
manifestations, and quantitative relevant data.
This distinction resembles the Kantian dualism amid “is” and “ought” and flanked by “con-
stitutional text and constitutional reality” (die Unterscheidung von sein und sollen,
(Verfassungs-)Recht und (Verfassungs)Wirklichkeit).92 One can wonder if either the “is” and
“ought,” or the “text” and “reality” are truly separate or if they connect on some level.
An interesting way to unveil this theoretical oxymoron is by recalling Karl Löwenstein’s famous
dilemma. Löwenstein was a German philosopher exiled in the United States during World War II.
Having experienced the fragility of human rights protection and how constitutions lacked the
strength to block fundamental rights’ violations, he longed to discover the magic formula for a
lasting constitution.93 In his search for how to balance old constitutional texts with new societal
and political scenarios, he designed the “theory of the normative force of the constitution,” still
very popular in European academia.94 According to his theory, to prevent being merely semantic
or nominal, the constitutional text should not be detached from political and sociological realities
—the living constitution or the law in action. In this sense, both constitutional text and constitu-
tional reality, in other words the living constitution, are of paramount importance and influence
one another. What a constitution “is” and what it “ought” to be are not worlds apart. Likewise,
joint normative and empirical studies on constitutional amendments are bound to be a combined
line of inquiry.
87Albert, supra note 2, at 3; Sandford Levinson, Designing an Amendment Process, in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND
DEMOCRATIC RULE 271, 275 (John A. Ferejohn et al. eds., 2001).
88LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 352 (2014); David Law,
Constitutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 398 (Peter Cane & Herbert Kritzer eds., 2012).
89Yung-Chien Chang & Peng-Hsiang Wang, The Empirical Foundation of Normative Arguments in Legal Reasoning
(Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 745, 2016). See also Joshua B.
Fischman, Reuniting ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ in Empirical Legal Scholarship, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 168–77 (2013).
90Contiades & Fotiadou, supra note 8, at 221. See also Pablo Castillo-Ortiz, Constitutional Review in the Member States of
the EU-28: A Political Analysis of Institutional Choices, 47 J.L. & SOC‘Y 87 (2020).
91Passchier, supra note 78, at 1084.
92PETER HÄBERLE, SCHRIFTEN ZUM ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHT 29–30 (2008).
93Botelho, supra note 7, at 353–54.
94KARL LÖWENSTEIN, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 151–54 (2000).
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Notwithstanding the current official rhetoric, bridging normative and empirical approaches—
the former more focused on the theoretical and qualitative questions and the latter more con-
cerned with the interpretation of quantitative data—will certainly contribute to the development
of legal scholarship and guide pertinent legal reforms.
Constitutional design, either through a constitutional foundation or constitutional change, is
one of the most intriguing and fascinating subjects of constitutional theory. Constitutional theory
scholars discuss the deepest theoretical constitutional dilemmas: What is a constitution? Why the
need for a constitution? Is there an ideal constitution? Can there be constitutionalism without a
written constitution? What is the material constitution? Which cultural, societal, and historical
factors determine constitutional design? Is it better to have a prolix or a laconic constitutional
text? Do social, economic, and cultural rights belong in the constitution? Should constitutions
be entrenched? Can entrenchment reveal a given constitutional identity? Are substantial limita-
tions to the amendment power consistent with deliberative democracy? How can constitutional-
ism survive its intrinsic democratic paradox? Can constitutional or supreme courts declare the
unconstitutionality of constitutional amendments? How can a constitutional text survive incon-
sistency over time? What is the normative force of a constitution? How can a constitutional text
truly reflect and influence the living constitution?95
If amendment rules are “the gatekeepers”96 of the constitutional text, how should scholarship
approach such a delicate constitutional law subject? Should it only be through doctrinal studies?
Or is there room for empirical analysis?
As Lutz emphasized, “little has been written about the empirical patterns that result from con-
stitutional choice.”97 It seems that a good constitutional design will have a constitutional text that
is neither too easy nor too difficult to amend, therefore balancing the democratic volatility with
constitutional endurance.
Measuring constitutional design will always be a challenge to empirical studies. Constitution-
making and amending are not entirely predictable, as neither are precise exercises of constitu-
tional design.98 In fact, many factors contribute to this volatility, such as political bargaining,
popular participation, and historical and sociological predispositions. The “overwhelming variety
of national constitutional amendment procedures” results in complex methodological chal-
lenges.99 Even when a constitutional text consecrates highly-rigid procedures or entrenches several
subjects from ever being amended through eternity clauses, empirical evidence shows us that:
95Amongst many seminal contributions, see AKHIL R. AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION TODAY: TIMELESS LESSONS FOR THE
ISSUES OF OUR ERA (2016); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A
CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS, (2009); CHRIS THORNHILL, A SOCIOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONS (2011); DIETER GRIMM,
DIE ZUKUNFT DER VERFASSUNG (1991); CONSTANTINO MORTATI, LA COSTITUZIONE IN SENSO MATERIALE (1940);
EDUARDO GARCÍA DE ENTERRÍA, LA CONSTITUCIÓN COMO NORMA Y EL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL (2006); GEORG
JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE, 394–434 (1986); GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS (2012); HANS
KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (2009); KARL LÖWENSTEIN, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 151–54 (2000); KONRAD HESSE, DIE
NORMATIVE KRAFT DER VERFASSUNG (1959); LAURENCE TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008); LAURENCE TRIBE &
MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1993); MARK A. GRABER, SANFORD LEVINSON & MARK TUSHNET,
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (2018); MARTIN LOUGHLIN & NEIL WALKER, THE PARADOX OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2007); Mattias Kumm, Constituent Power, Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, and Post-Positivist Law,
14 ICON 697 (2016); NOBERTO BOBBIO, L’ETÀ DEI DIRITTI (1990); OTTO BACHOF, VERFASSUNGSWIDRIGE
VERFASSUNGSNORMEN? (1951); Panu P. Minkinnen, Political Constitutionalism vs. Political Constitutional Theory: Law,
Power and Politics, 11 ICON 585 (2015); PETER HÄBERLE, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE ALS KULTURWISSENSCHAFT (1998); RAN
HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); Richard
Epstein, Can We Design an Optimal Constitution? Of Structural Ambiguity and Rights Clarity, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 290
(2011); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978) Rudolf Smend, Integrationlehre, in STAATSRECHTLICHE
ABHANDLUNGEN UND ANDERE AUFSÄTZE 475 (1968).
96Albert, supra note 2, at 1.
97Lutz, supra note 31, at 355. See also Rasch & Congleton, supra note 6, at 549.
98Anna Fruhstorfer, Consistency in Constitutional Design and Its Effect on Democracy, 26 DEMOCRATIZATION 1028 (2019).
99Lorenz, supra note 15, at 341.
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(i) informal constitutional change works around these limitations through judicial review or the
approval of new legislation,100 or (ii) in extreme circumstances, obsolete eternity clauses are
indeed abolished through constitutional amendment.101
E. Conclusions
Our Article pursues an empirical exploration of the institutional process for constitutional amend-
ments, or amendment difficulty, by looking at procedural and substantive limits. We make use of a
unique dataset collected by the authors, the dataset explored by Tom Ginsburg and James
Melton102 and three past indicators, namely George Tsebelis,103 Astrid Lorenz,104 and Dag
Anckar and Lauri Karvonen105 as reported by Lorenz.
Our indicators result from factor analysis. They reflect procedure—a standard dimension
already echoed by previous authors—and substance—an additional dimension usually neglected.
The inclusion of explicit and implicit substantive limits constrains the sample of countries to the
European Union and other jurisdictions in its periphery.
Previous literature has underlined the lack of consistency across indicators of constitutional rigidity.
Although we find some similar patterns of results, we identify a few important features. Some indica-
tors are related to a certain degree andmeasure to procedural limitations. However, no indicator seems
to capture the mix of procedure and substance in the way we suggest in this Article.
Extending the present methodology to a larger group of countries would be an important test
on the consistency across indicators and the relationship between procedure and substance when
determining the amendment indicator. However, gathering information about explicit and
implicit substantive limits might pose a challenge to empirical research.
The visible differences in the way certain countries are characterized in each indicator—for
example, Bulgaria or the Czech Republic—suggest that the process of aggregating constitutional
mechanisms and instruments is inevitably controversial and subject to varying empirical assess-
ments. Rather than taking this as a shortcoming, we should view it as an exploring exercise that
helps scholars identify regularities that require further research and more detailed country
analysis.
Most empirical studies presuppose that codified rules matter, meaning that they actually suc-
ceed in constraining or shaping constitutional amendment. This is not always the case, even with
democratic constitutions. Inevitably, expanding the traditional empirical analysis of procedural
rules to account for substantive amendment rules is not enough. A further step in the research
agenda should be to include uncodified rules that are respected. As Richard Albert points out,
“rankings of amendment difficulty are doomed to failure unless they become much more sophis-
ticated in what they set out to measure and why.”106
100Versteeg & Zachin, supra note 12, at 660.
101Abebe, supra note 23, at 104. See also Botelho, supra note 7, at 363–67.
The current version of the Portuguese Constitution contains 14 clauses of entrenchment, since some were removed or
altered in the constitutional amendment of 1989. Therefore, it is quite clear that the unchangeable clause was indeed
changed. . . . The Portuguese Constitution does not seem to allow a simultaneous double revision, which is the
synchronized amendment of the entrenchment clause and of the principles and articles related to that limit.
However, the sheer fact is that the 1989 amendment did operate a simultaneous amendment, eliminating former para-
graph j) from the substantial limits list and also some obsolete and politically biased norms which allowed only one form
of economic organisation. At the same time, article 81 of the Constitution was modified regarding “nationalizations”
and “rural estate property,” while other significant changes were introduced in the economic Constitution, concerning
the “structure of the means of production.”
102Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 11.
103Tsebelis, supra note 15.
104Lorenz, supra note 15.
105Anckar & Karvonen, supra note 55.
106Albert, supra note 32, at 126.
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The motivation behind constitutional amendment rules is not always crystal-clear. In fact, that
is why Xenophon Contiades and Alkemene Fotiadou interestingly wrote that constitutional
change “is an enigmatic process.”107 In this sense, amendment rates may not truly capture the
essence of a given constitution. The visible constitution can certainly be measured and rated
in comparison with other constitutional texts. However, the invisible constitution, which lies
beneath constitutional reality and constitutional culture, is difficult to manifest in pure statistical
numbers.108
At the same time, in the vein of Tom Ginsburg and James Melton,109 the contradictions
observed in the literature on indicators might simply reinforce the view that amendment rules,
both procedural and substantive, are much less important than a certain political tradition or
amendment culture.
Appendix
Table A1. Procedure, Substance, and Amendment Indicators
procedure substance amendment Ginsburg Melton Data
Albania −0.20 −0.84 −0.61 0.75
Austria 0.99 −0.75 0.14 −0.20
Belgium 0.01 1.01 0.60 −1.67
Bulgaria −0.33 −0.84 −0.69 2.24
Croatia −1.91 −0.84 −1.61 0.92
Cyprus 1.55 1.45 1.76 −0.38
Czech Rep 1.55 0.66 1.30 −2.00
Denmark −2.25 −0.84 −1.81 0.16
Estonia −0.23 −0.84 −0.63 0.99
Finland −0.31 −0.84 −0.68 0.88
France 0.11 0.54 0.38 −1.52
Germany 1.55 1.45 1.76 −1.20
Greece 0.88 1.45 1.37 1.18
Hungary 0.55 −0.84 −0.17 −0.38
Iceland −2.03 −0.84 −1.68 0.14
Ireland −1.27 −0.84 −1.24 0.65
Israel −0.40 −0.84 −0.73 −0.20
Italy 0.99 0.63 0.95 −2.17
Latvia −0.20 −0.84 −0.61 0.67
Lithuania 0.64 −0.83 −0.11 0.23
(Continued)
107Contiades & Fotiadou, supra note 8, at 219.
108Günter Frankenberg, Comparative Constitutional Studies: Between Magic and Deceit 74 (2018) (arguing that compara-
tists should realize that “they are not merely fact-hunters, but interpreters of culture and cultural artefacts”).
109Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 11.
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Table A1. (Continued.)
procedure substance amendment Ginsburg Melton Data
Luxembourg −0.20 0.54 0.20 0.01
Malta 0.33 −0.84 −0.49 0.67
Netherlands 0.01 −0.84 −0.44 −0.97
Norway 0.32 1.45 1.04 −0.70
Poland 0.11 −0.84 −0.43 0.36
Portugal 0.86 1.45 1.35 −0.90
Romania 1.33 1.45 1.63 −2.17
Russia 0.00 0.99 0.58 −0.03
Serbia −0.32 −0.84 −0.61 0.86
Slovak Rep 0.33 −0.84 −0.30 −0.38
Slovenia −0.55 −0.84 −0.82 0.62
Spain 1.01 −0.84 0.10 −1.57
Sweden −1.71 −0.84 −1.50 0.87
Switzerland 0.13 1.02 0.67 −0.35
Turkey 0.33 1.45 1.04 0.75
UK −1.78 1.01 −0.45 −0.20
Ukraine 0.00 1.02 0.60 0.99
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